This paper provides evidence on the decision of consumers to move from an "old" (copperbased) to a "new" (fiber-based) broadband technology, specifically taking into account the impact of regulatory interventions imposed on the old technology. The analysis in this paper has been applied to a sample of EU25 countries using panel data from 2003 to 2015 on the adoption of fiber-based broadband technology by households and firms. Results show that an increase in the regulated price for accessing the old existing network favors consumer adoption of the new technology. In particular, we find that an increase in the unbundling price of 10% increases fiber-based adoption in the range of 0.7-1%. Our results also provide insights on the take-up rate of the new technology, i.e. on the ratio between adopted and deployed fiber-based services and networks. By comparing the quantitative effects of regulation we find that an increase in the access price decreases the take-up rate, meaning that broadband coverage increases more than fiber adoption.
Introduction
Historically, "old" fixed-line (or "legacy") networks based on a copper-wire infrastructure were built to support narrowband voice telephony services only. These legacy networks were later upgraded to what are known as DSL technologies to deliver standard broadband services.
1 However, the performance of DSL technologies based on copper infrastructure is severely limited in terms of capacity and the services that could be provided to final consumers. Moreover, copper-based legacy networks have always been subject to ex ante regulation in the European Union (EU) since those networks have been traditionally managed by a single "incumbent" operator in EU member states. 2 Meanwhile, competition has evolved in the industry due to the evolution of alternative technologies in the fixed broadband markets (referred to as "intramodal" competition), such as the coaxial transmission technologies operated by cable-TV providers, and the competition from mobile networks ( "intermodal" competition), which gave rise to the so-called "fixed-mobile substitution" phenomenon (Vogelsang, 2010) mostly driven by massive technological progress in the mobile industry in the last two decades.
In a time of increasing digitalization, operators of old broadband networks are facing a huge increase in demand for bandwidth and real time criteria due to the presence of interactive multimedia services, such as video streaming on demand, file sharing, online gaming, and high definition television, as well as specific business applications, such as cloud computing services. Broadband networks based on optical fiber technology (so called "Next Generation
Networks" -NGN) enable a massive increase in bandwidth capacity. These broadband 1 DSL is a generic term used for the family of "Digital Subscriber Line" technologies, which provide internet access by transmitting digital data over copper lines. 2 The term "incumbent" refers to former -mostly state-owned -telecommunications monopolists of "legacy"
infrastructure. For an institutional analysis of the EU regulatory framework see also Cambini and Rondi (2012) .
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networks can be considered a general purpose technology (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995) , which has the potential to trigger productivity gains and growth across major economic sectors on a massive scale as a result of complementarities in product and process applications. 3 However, these potential gains can only be achieved if business users and consumers are not only physically connected to such networks but also show sufficient willingness to pay and adopt the new fiber-based services.
In view of the expected benefits from fiber investments, the European Commission (EC) has decided to strengthen the competitiveness of Europe's economy in its Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) which has specified goals in terms of network coverage and service adoption already in 2010: The DAE "seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans will have access to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households will subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps" (European Commission, 2010, p. 19) .
While target (i) refers to network coverage of 100 per cent of the population, target (ii) refers to a minimum level of household adoption of fiber-based broadband services.
Whereas there has been some considerable progress across Europe in terms of fiber-based broadband coverage, it is quite unlikely that target (ii) will be met in the coming years.
Indeed, adoption, i.e. the demand for fiber-based broadband adoption among households and firms, and take-up rates, i.e. the ratio between fiber adoption to population covered or supplied with fiber-based lines, are lagging far behind (see European Commission, 2014, and 3 Majumdar et al. (2010) , for instance, estimate the economic benefits related to broadband as a general purpose technology and find a significant positive impact on consumers and firm productivity. Numerous other studies support the view that investment in old broadband infrastructures, and based on the adoption of broadband services, has a positive impact on the economic system and leads to an increase in GDP growth. In particular, Czernich et al. (2011) have shown that a 10% increase in the broadband adoption rate in OECD countries results in a 1-1.5% increase in the annual GDP per capita.
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Figure A.1 in the Annex). The more satisfied consumers are with conventional broadband services, or the more reluctant consumers are to adopt new technologies (Fontana, 2008) , the greater the gap will be with the newly installed network capacity. The latter incurs social costs due to over-capacity. Only if consumers consider fiber-based broadband services attractive enough, in terms of innovations or quality improvements compared with old broadband services, will they move to fiber-based lines and adopt the new technology.
What are the main drivers of fiber-based adoption in Europe and, in particular, what role can the existing regulation of the old "legacy" ("copper-wire") network play to encourage fiber adoption? Although the underlying regulation-induced trade-offs between innovation and competition have been well-known in theory for some time now (Woroch, 1998; Vogelsang, 2012) , this paper makes a first attempt to answer these questions using the specific example of fiber adoption. We first develop a simplified theoretical model that points out the interplay between the adoption of fiber lines and the access price to a legacy network. The model shows that, in line with Bourreau et al. (2012) and Crandall et al. (2013) ,, an increase in the access charge to the copper-based network is expected to affect not only the retail prices of the old technology based services but also the consumers' decision to switch to fiber-based technology, by reducing the gap between the retail prices of the services based on the old technology and fiber-based services. Then, using recent panel data from 25 European Union Members States (EU25) for the years 2003 to 2015, we empirically examine the role of a mandatory wholesale access regime imposed on the old network in fiber adoption. In particular, we focus the empirical test on the impact of what is known as the "unbundling" price (local loop unbundling, LLU) which represents the most relevant wholesale access obligation in Europe imposed on the incumbent's legacy infrastructure. Note that unbundling prices are not commercially set by the infrastructure operators but instead set directly by national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in individual member states subject to framework directives at the EU level (European Commission, 2000) . The prominent role of access ~ 6 ~ pricing policies in the transition from copper to fiber networks is also acknowledged by recent recommendations from the EC.
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This paper is a first attempt to empirically assess the complex interplay between regulation on an old technology and the adoption of the new fiber-based technology. In particular, our intention is to provide empirical evidence for the presence of the so-called "retail-level migration effect" found in the theoretical model by Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012; 2014) : this effect implies that consumers might be incentivized to migrate from the old-lowquality technology to the new high-quality one as long as the price differential between the two services shrinks. Since the retail price of the old copper-based services is highly influenced by the level of the regulated access price, especially in countries where the unbundling regime has been broadly established, we first provide a simplified model that illustrates this effect and then empirically test whether a change in the wholesale price, by increasing the retail price to old copper-based broadband lines, influences the adoption rate of the new technology-based fiber-lines in Europe.
Results show that, in countries where the unbundling regime is established on a wide scale, the unbundling access price imposed on the old legacy-based technology exerts a positive and significant impact on fiber adoption. This implies that a policy measure that increases the cost of accessing the old broadband network, though affecting competition, could exert a positive 4 See the recommendation on "Regulated Access to NGANs" (C(2010) 6223) and the recommendation on "Consistent non-discrimination on obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment" (C(2013) 5761). The latter states that the access prices of the traditional copper networks should remain stable over the coming years in order to sustain investment in next-generation networks and favor migration at retail level (paragraphs 44 and 45). Some NRAs (in Germany, Italy and Spain for example) have followed the EU recommendation implementing stable unbundling prices (in nominal terms),
while others (such as the French NRA) have decided to raise the unbundling price above the (long-term) cost to better stimulate investment and migration at retail level.
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effect on adoption rates of the new technology. However, and interestingly from a policy perspective, these effects are greatly reduced in Eastern European countries that are characterized by a lack of a well-developed legacy network and where unbundling regimes thus play a more minor role. This result casts doubts on the EC´s current policy of creating a uniform regulatory framework to be applied in all EU countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature while Section 3 first presents a simplified theoretical model describing the interplay between access regulation and ultra-broadband adoption and then provides the testable hypotheses we derived from such a model. Section 4 presents the empirical baseline specification and the identification strategy. Section 5 outlines the panel dataset that underlies the empirical examination. Section 6 presents the main estimation results related to NGN adoption as well as some immediate policy implications related to the NGN take-up rate. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Literature review
Fiber networks do not immediately replace copper or cable legacy networks, suggesting that the transition from services based on the old technology to new ones will move slowly. This implies that, during a transition phase, two different technologies will operate in parallel, and the incentives to invest in fiber networks will therefore also be influenced by the terms of access set for the legacy copper networks. The recent theoretical literature (Bourreau et al., 2012; Bourreau et al., 2014; Inderst & Peitz, 2012) has focused on how access regulation on an old network technology affect investments in new network technologies and favor migration, at a retail level.
The first systematic theoretical analysis on this issue was provided by Bourreau et al. (2012 Bourreau et al. ( , 2014 . The authors consider a model in which access to the legacy copper network is ~ 8 ~ available throughout an entire country and an incumbent and an entrant compete for the provision of retail broadband services to consumers by investing in a new fiber-based broadband technology. The entrant operator could also ask for mandatory access to the legacy network in the form of unbundling. 5 Under the assumption that the unbundling regime is available everywhere in a country, their main results show that investment in fiber-based broadband networks varies non-monotonically with the access price. This result is due to the coexistence of three different effects: (i) the "replacement effect", which hinders investment by alternative operators when the access price is low; (ii) the "wholesale revenue effect", which discourages the incumbent from investing in a higher quality network when the access price is high; (iii) the "retail level migration effect" which exerts a direct impact on fiberbased broadband adoption: when the (unbundling) access price is low, the retail prices of the services that rely on the copper network are also low. Therefore, in order to encourage customers to switch from old to fiber-based services, operators should also offer low prices for those services. This effect ultimately also reduces the profitability of fiber adoption, and hence, the incentive to invest in it.
While the first two effects are directly related to the incentives to deploy the new technology, the third one introduces a peculiar demand side effect. The goal of our analysis is thus to provide empirical support for the presence of such a retail level migration effect in Europe. To this aim, in Section 3 we construct a simple model with the aim to highlight how the access price to the old copper-based technology favors the adoption of fiber-based services. 5 In their model, the country is composed of a continuum of areas, for which the fixed cost of rolling out the NGN varies (higher investment costs in rural areas compared to urban ones). Firms decide sequentially on their investments in fiber technology in the different regional markets, with the incumbent firm as the first mover, due to its historical control over the legacy network.
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The empirical evidence on fiber-based broadband adoption is limited. Some papers, such as Denni and Gruber (2007) , Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010) and Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2015) , have focused on the interplay between the adoption of standard (but not fiber-based) broadband services and the existence of access regulation and local loop unbundling in particular, without considering the impact of the level of the unbundling price on broadband adoption as we do in this paper. Focusing more specifically on fiber-based broadband adoption, Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) To summarize, none of the above empirical papers analyses the indirect cross-price effect of the wholesale price imposed on the old network technology on fiber-based broadband adoption in order to prove the existence of the retail level migration effect as described in the theoretical literature. The present paper thus has the broader aim of examining the role of regulation on stimulating the European digital policy in terms of the NGN adoption goal.
A theoretical model and testable hypotheses
The theoretical literature points out the key role that the regulated wholesale access price to the old (copper-wire based) network may have in favoring fiber via the so-called retail level migration effect (Bourreau et al., 2012) .
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In order to derive sound testable predictions, we develop an illustrative model with the aim of pointing out the main economic features of this effect.
Consider a model à la Hotelling with vertical differentiation. 6 A unit mass of consumers is uniformly located on the segment [0,1] while two firms are located at the two extremities. We denote by A (respectively B) the firm located at the origin (respectively at the end) of the line.
Firm A provides high-quality telecom services (i.e fiber-based services), while firm B provides services of a lower quality (in our case, copper-based services).
The utility of a consumer to buy services from one or the other firm is given by + − − , where d is the distance of the consumer from a firm, t the per unit transport cost and is the extra-value for a consumer to use services provided by firm i, i = A, B. Assume also that > , that is using fiber services leads to a higher utility than using standard copperbased services. v is instead the basic gross surplus for having an internet line at home. + thus represents the total gross surplus (i.e. the willingness to pay) for having internet services of high/fiber-based (A) or low/copper-based (B) quality. Finally, p A and p B are the retail prices of fiber-based and copper-based services, respectively.
The two firms compete in the provision of the final service. On the cost side, we assume that both firms have to pay a per unit cost for the final provision of the services; we denote this cost with c and normalize it to 0. However, firm B needs to rely to the existing copper-based network to provide its final services. To this aim, firm B has to pay an access fee, a, to get access to the copper-based network. This access price is assumed to be exogenously set by a national regulator. 7 Hence firm B takes this price as given when deciding its pricing policy, 6 The results qualitatively do not change even when we use a model of product differentiation à la Singh and Vives (1984) or a pure model with quality differentiation à la Katz and Shapiro (1985) . 7 We do not model the regulatory decision to set this tariff since it is out of scope for this paper. For a more complete analysis on how a regulator can set this access price, see Bourreau et al. (2012) .
~ 11 ~
while firm A does not need to face such costs since it uses its own fiber-based infrastructure in the provision of its retail services.
The indifferent consumer choosing between buying a fiber-or a copper-based broadband service is given by the condition: + − − = + − − (1 − ), leading to the following expression:
Note that x represents the demand of service for firm A and thus, in our simplified setting, the adoption of fiber-based services.
Firm A's profit is equal to = . Therefore, firm A's reaction function is:
Firm B's profit is given by = ( − )(1 − ) . Firm B's reaction function is thus given by:
The equilibrium is given by the following conditions:
Note that the equilibrium prices in (1) depend on the access price and the difference in service qualities. In their empirical investigation, Calzada and Martinez-Santos (2014) also consider the access price and the difference in service quality as the main determinants of broadband prices.
It is interesting to point out what are the effect of the access charge, a, on the differences in retail prices between "old" and "new" services. In particular, in equilibrium the price differential between fiber-based and copper-based services, i.e. * − * , is given by the following condition:
From equation (1) we observe that an increase in a leads to an increase of both prices but the price differential in (2)shrinks, since the copper-based price increases more than the fiberbased price. Given the equilibrium prices, the adoption of fiber-based services in equilibrium, x*, is thus given by the following condition: * = + +
Equation (3) shows that the higher α is, that is, the higher the regulated price on the "old" copper based network set by the national regulator is, the higher the adoption of fiber-based services by final consumers.
Equations (2) and (3) thus provide a quantitative representation of the so-called retail level migration effect developed in Bourreau et al. (2012) in a more general framework in which incentives to invest in high-quality technology have also been developed.
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In conclusion, our simplified theoretical model shows that, in a country where the unbundling regime is largely established, the access price on copper networks has a positive effect on fiber-based broadband adoption: any increase in the access price would be translated into a higher retail price for basic broadband services, thus making those services less attractive than the fiber-based ones. Consumers will then prefer to adopt the new broadband technologies and enjoy higher quality services. The following hypothesis can therefore be tested: as well as the two sub-groups of EU16 and EU9 Eastern European countries. The diffusion process on the demand side is typically related to network effects or consumer inertia (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Grajek & Kretschmer, 2009; Grajek & Röller, 2012; Briglauer, 2014) . In what follows, we first outline the dynamic adoption model and then describe the estimation and identification strategy (Section 4.1).
In view of the testable hypotheses presented in Section 3, the dynamic model, in which NGN adoption is expressed in logs 9 for EU member state i and year t, reads as follows:
Taking logs of the (lagged) dependent variables yields an S-type Gompertz functional diffusion process which is commonly assumed in the empirical ICT literature (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Andres et al., 2010; Lin and Wu, 2013; Briglauer, 2014) . We decided to employ the Gompertz model as other S-type functional forms, such as logistic models in particular, require estimates of the saturation level (total number of potential adopters) which is inherently difficult to estimate if the diffusion process is still in an early process and has not even reached its inflection point (as suggested in Figure A .1). Also, the log transformation has the effect that variables such as the (lagged) dependent variables which are positive and skewed are closer to a normal distribution and it flattens potentially non-stationary variables.
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Following our illustrative model presented in Section 3, the main independent variable in Equation 0 is access_regulation, i.e. the extent of regulation in terms of wholesale obligations in country i in time t; access_regulation is measured using two (j = 1, 2) different variables, as further described in Section 5.2. This in also in line with other recent empirical studies (e.g. Calzada and Martinez, 2014) , where retail broadband prices are mainly a function of the access price set by regulators. In fact, unbundling prices represent about 60-80% of the total costs faced by telecom operators in the provision of retail services (ERG, 2007) .
Moreover, in line with the equation (3), fiber adoption is expected to be influenced by the quality differential of the old and new broadband networks. The variable legacy provides a broad measure of the quality of the old network infrastructure.
The dynamics of the adoption process (see also footnote 9) can be captured by including the lagged dependent variable as an additional right-hand side explanatory variable. The specification in equation (1) first set of control variables (denoted by C it ) are related to the degree of (inter-or intra-modal) competition, thus considering the potential impact from alternative broadband technologies (such as basic DSL/cable or mobile broadband access). Z it represents a second set of additional demand and cost controls that may affect fiber-based broadband adoption (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Grajek & Roller, 2011; Briglauer, 2014) . Finally, φ it represents an additive error term, and θ i and λ t country-specific and time fixed effects, respectively.
Estimation and identification strategy
In order to identify causal effects of regulatory policies, as devised by the EC and imposed by NRAs, we use fixed-effect regressions to control for potential endogeneity due to unobserved and time-constant heterogeneity at the country level (θ) as well as time effects (λ) to control for any time specific shocks that are common to all cross-sectional units (Member States).
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However, estimating equation (1) by means of an ordinary fixed-effect (FE) estimator, would yield inconsistent and biased results, since the lagged dependent variable and the error terms would be correlated (Nickell, 1981) . In order to identify the parameters of the dynamic models, we employ a bias-corrected fixed-effect estimator (FEC), developed by Bruno (2005a; 2005b) specifically for dynamic unbalanced panel data, and a small number of crosssectional units (N = 25).
As part of our robustness specifications, we also provide instrumental variable (IV) estimations where the main regulatory variables related to the access price have been instrumented using exogenous sources of variation as described in Section 5.3. Issues of endogeneity might arise for the following reasons: In countries where NGN adoption is particularly low, NRAs might decide to change the level of the access price to the old network to stimulate migration. Therefore, the wholesale price decision might be affected by the level of fiber adoption. Furthermore, omitted variables such as NGN specific quality characteristics might be related to both NGN adoption and the unbundling price. 
Data

Dependent variables
Adoption of fiber-based broadband lines, denoted with NGN_adop, is measured by the total number of consumers (normalized to households) who adopt at least one service offered via the NGN on a commercial basis. In contrast, NGN coverage is measured by the total number of deployed lines normalized to the total number of households. Network coverage represents the installed capacity, in physical units, which provides consumers with potential access to NGN and functions as a pre-condition for NGN adoption.
As already said, Figure A .1 points out that NGN adoption follows a diffusion process, pertaining to EU25 countries as well as the two sub-groups of EU16 and EU9 Eastern European countries, 12 while this is not the case for NGN take-up rate. As regards NGN takeup rates one can infer from Figure A .1 that these are significantly higher at the very beginning, i.e. in the years from 2004 to 2007. One obvious explanation might be that NGNs were initially deployed in areas in which consumers with a very high willingness to pay live, resulting in a high adoption levels of installed fiber-lines and hence in high take-up rates.
developments in these countries but rather to the fact that they joined the EU at later stages and hence were not obliged to report market data to the EC before.
11 Overall, about 0.8% of all the raw data were calculated using linear interpolation or had to be extrapolated constantly for future values.
12 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have been included in the Eastern European country group according to apparent thresholds in coverage levels of legacy networks and broadband adoption (see grey-shaded area in Table A. 3). Hence, the EU16 group includes all other EU25 member states.
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Furthermore, during the first years of fiber-based broadband expansion, many field experiments were conducted by operators in which the consumers were either volunteers or they obtained special offers (in some cases without having to pay any extra price).
Independent variables
As pointed out in Section 3, our main purpose is to test for the presence of the retail level migration effect which relates fiber-based broadband adoption to the level of the regulated access price to the legacy network. Theory also shows that the retail level migration effect is expected to exist in countries where the access regime is diffused everywhere, i.e. entrants can potentially request access to any available lines subject to a well-established legacy network.
To this aim, our main independent variable, access_regulation in equation (4), is proxied by using two approaches.
The first approach is to measure the access regime with the logarithm of the unbundling access price, measured in €/month and denoted with ln(llu_price); the unbundling price represents by far the most relevant form of (wholesale) broadband DSL regulation when considering migration from old to new broadband technologies ("LLU access" in Figure   1Figure 1) and is set directly by NRAs.
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However, the unbundling price only provides a limited representation of the overall complexity of real world unbundling regimes, which include several other institutional and technical annex regulations besides the monthly access price. In fact, a sufficiently wellestablished unbundling regime is a pre-requisite for the retail level migration effect, which implies that the impact of the unbundling price can be expected to depend on the extent of the 13 This access instrument has become the most widely used entry mode by alternative operators in recent decades and has complemented the interconnection charges used since the beginning of the liberalization process. For more details see Cambini and Rondi (2012 The quality of the old legacy network, legacy in equation (1), is measured by the total number of traditional (analogous) fixed-linked PSTN lines per 100 inhabitants which represents a country's basic network infrastructure stock that can be utilized for any kind of narrowband service and upgraded to enable basic broadband services.
Instrumental variables
First, we consider the yearly average unbundling and so-called shared access prices in all other (non-focal) EU countries, denoted llu_euprice and sa_euprice, as "geographic"
instruments (Grajek & Röller, 2012) . Whereas unbundling provides full access to the incumbent´s local loop access lines, shared access provides another form of wholesale access (Figure 1Figure 1) which is, however, limited access to the upper line bandwidth.
Nevertheless, shared access and unbundling prices are closely related, since both are determined by NRAs on the basis of (common) network cost elements. Clearly, the NRA of country i sets its own access prices but cannot influence the access prices set by other NRAs in other countries l¹i. The rationale behind employing these geographic instruments is the harmonization process within the EU, which makes it difficult for a single Member State to radically deviate from the regulatory measures imposed in the rest of EU. In essence, the ~ 20 ~ eCommunications framework contains some explicit and implicit rules to incentivize harmonization and "punish" deviating NRAs by requiring stronger proof of evidence in the course of consultation and notifications procedures with the EC (Renda, 2016) .
Second, we further make use of the fact that unbundling prices are typically determined on the basis of costs related to deploying access networks. These costs depend, in particular, on population or household density ("economies of density") and other demographic characteristics. Urbanization, urban_pop, is a better measure of deployment costs than household or population density, pop_dens, because a hypothetical move of all households to one city would not change average household density but would have a massive impact on average NGN deployment costs. However, urbanization might also impact NGN adoption via several channels related to demographic characteristics apart from its impact via the unbundling price and in a more comprehensive fashion than other measures of population density. If we control for urbanization as a second stage explanatory variable, we can employ a measure of population density, pop_dens, as an exogenous source of variation which should then exert no impact on NGN adoption other than through the unbundling price. Finally, we use lagged levels of the unbundling price variables as an additional and "internal" instrumental variable. We employ different subsets of instruments in order to examine the validity of instruments and robustness of IV estimations.
Further control variables
Apart from our main independent variables related to the unbundling price and the quality of the legacy network as derived from the theoretical literature, we also introduce several controls in our model specification to further mitigate the omitted variables problem.
A first set of variables are related to competition in retail broadband markets: the first one stems from mobile networks ("intermodal" competition). In order to account for mobile network competition, we introduce a variable to account for fixed-mobile substitution; this variable, denoted with fms, relates the total number of mobile lines to the total number of fixed landlines. The second competition variable, denoted with bb_ne, represents the entrants´ retail market share in fixed broadband lines, and thus the impact of fixed ("intramodal") competition on old broadband markets on emerging NGN markets. In particular, this variable captures retail competition stemming from any kind of access-based entrants and coaxial cable TV operators.
A second comprehensive set of demand and cost controls as well as macroeconomic controls, Z, have also been included, in line with standard controls employed in the previous literature.
A detailed description of all the controls can be found in Table A .1 in the Annex. 
Empirical Results and policy implications
The results of the dynamic adoption model are first discussed in Section 6.1. The estimation results on NGN adoption in combination with the results on NGN coverage from the previous empirical literature provide important implications for the NGN take-up rate which we discuss in Section 6.2. Table 1 reports the results of the FEC estimations of various NGN adoption models.
Dynamic NGN adoption model
Regression (1) presents the estimates of the basic specification ("base") in equation (1) As far as the variables related to the unbundling price are concerned, the coefficient estimates of the main term in logs, ln(llu_price), are insignificant in regressions (1) and (4) in Table 1 .
The coefficient of the interaction term ln(llu_price)*ms_llu is significant at the 10% level and positive in all specifications. The combined marginal effect is positive but insignificant in all specifications even in case of a fully effective unbundling regime (ms_llu = 1). However, comparing regressions (1) and (2) as well as (4) and (5), respectively, shows that the omitted variable bias is low if we drop the insignificant main term ln(llu_price). This is in fact expected in our case, since the coefficient of the main term, ln(llu_price), measures the marginal effect of the unbundling price when the unbundling market share is zero (i.e.,
ϑln(NGN_adop)/ϑ ln(llu_price)
given ms_llu = 0 is β 1 ). 15 Obviously, when unbundling is not implemented in the market, the effect of the unbundling price must be zero on a priori grounds for all levels of the access price. Accordingly, in interpreting the overall marginal effect of the unbundling price it is legitimate to focus on the specifications in regressions (2), (3) and (5) which exclude the main term without incurring omitted variable bias (Balli and Sorensen, 2013) . In regression (2) the marginal effect of the interaction term ln(llu_price)*ms_llu on NGN adoption is positive and significant for each given level of the unbundling market. 16 These results are in line with our theoretical prediction and expectations (Hypothesis 1) and the previous literature; in particular, Calzada and Martinez (2014) found 15 Note that the variable ms_ull measures a market share and thus has a natural zero which justifies the theoretical prediction on the coefficient of the unbundling price. 16 Note that in differentiating with respect to the unbundling price variable ln(llu_price) we hold the unbundling market share, ms_llu, constant which is justified for small unbundling price changes and in view of institutional rigidities that prevent an immediate adjustment in unbundling activities.
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that broadband retail prices are lower in countries where entrants make greater use of unbundled access which corresponds to a more severe access regime, including lower unbundling prices.
In regressions (4)- (5), it is also examined whether the Eastern European countries (East = 1) 17 that exhibit a lack of well-developed legacy networks and technologies prior to NGN expansion experience a less pronounced effect of the unbundling regime. As expected (Hypothesis 2), from the coefficients of the interaction term ln(llu_price)*ms_llu*East, it can be inferred that the effect of the unbundling price is offset in Eastern European countries. The marginal effects in regressions (4) and (5) The coefficient estimate for the variable legacy is significant and negative when included.
This estimation result fits perfectly with our theoretical prediction in equation (3), according to which a higher quality level of the old network infrastructure results, ceteris paribus, in lower adoption of new broadband services. According to the F-test that "all θ i are zero" as reported at the bottom of Table 2 , ignoring fixed effects would likely result in omitted variable bias. In regressions (2)- (5) we re-estimate regression (2) in Table 1Table 1 using different specifications of the dependent variable. In regressions (2) and (3) we normalize NGN adoption with respect to the total population of a Member State (i.e., log of adopted NGN lines per capita instead of per households, denoted with ln(NGN_adop_pw)), whereas in regressions (4) and (5) we define the dependent variable as the log of adopted NGN lines (denoted with ln(NGN_adop)) without any population or household weighting (ln(NGN_adop_uw)). Note that regressions (3) and (5) (268) by the number of available groups (N = 25). The LSDVC standard errors in regressions (1)- (5) have been bootstrapped based on 200 iterations with bias correction initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) . There are no standard post-estimation routines available in STATA for the user written "xtlsdvc" command (Bruno, 2005b) . Therefore, the R 2 within has been provided on the basis of corresponding FE regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We do not include time effects which are jointly insignificant in all regressions and we do not include a constant which is eliminated by the within transformation. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Notes: Including the lagged dep. var. decreases the number of maximum observations (268) by the number of available groups (N = 25). The FEC standard errors in regressions (2)- (5) have been bootstrapped based on 200 iterations with bias correction initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) . There are no standard post-estimation routines available in STATA for the user written "xtlsdvc" command (Bruno, 2005b) . Therefore, the R 2 within in regressions (2)- (5) has been provided on the basis of corresponding FE regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We do not include time effects which are jointly insignificant in all regressions and we do not include a constant which is eliminated by the within transformation. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Figure 2Figure 2 reports the marginal effects of the unbundling price for various levels of the unbundling market share and two groups of European countries on the basis of the estimates in Table 1Table 1 As far as the competition variables are concerned, all regressions in Table 1Table 1 and Table   2Table 2, point to a negative impact of intramodal competition from broadband on NGN adoption whereas competition from mobile networks exerts no significant impact. To the extent that these competition variables capture market outcomes in terms of retail prices, the negative relationships can be seen as further evidence of the retail level migration effect.
However, the results could also be driven by the indirect impact of competition on investment (NGN coverage), suggesting that the Schumpeterian effect dominates the escape competition effect (Schmutzler and Sacco, 2011) .
The extent of the old network infrastructure (legacy) exerts a significantly negative impact on NGN adoption in all regression specifications. This indicates that a high quality of the old network infrastructure in terms of broad scale reach and well-established copper-based DSL technology diminishes incentives for consumers to adopt the new technology, which is in line with our hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) and model prediction (equation 3).
As regards our further controls, it emerges that the size of the old broadband market, ln(bb_lines), which proxies total willingness to pay for ICT services, has a significantly positive impact. In contrast, the rate of adoption of old broadband services, bb_lines_adop, counteracts this effect. Indeed, in the case in which old broadband services enjoy broad consumer acceptance in terms of high household or per capita adoption of basic broadband ~ 31 ~ services, the switching costs might be substantial and hinder consumer migration to NGN services.
18 Table 3Table 3 provides further robustness analysis on the basis of two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed effects estimation results for the specification in regression (2) in Table 1Table 1. The insignificant main term ln(llu_price) is omitted for the reasons explained above. Note that regressions (1) to (4) F-tests of excluded instruments from the respective first stage regressions confirm that the instruments are jointly highly significant in each specification. Furthermore, the KleibergenPaap (KP) LM statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified at the 10% level. We also examine the validity of our instruments. According to the p-values related to Hansen´s J statistic the respective sets of instruments are jointly valid (however, in regression (2) the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level).
It appears that the main estimation results of Table 2 carry over quite well although the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are -albeit highly significant and positivesubstantially lower than the corresponding coefficient estimates in Table 1 . This is expected as the 2SLS estimator employed in regressions (1)- (4) cannot employ the same FEC biascorrection and thus ignores the "dynamic bias" (Grajek & Röller, 2012) which necessarily 18 The reader is referred to Briglauer (2014) for NGN related empirical evidence and to Fontana (2008) for a more general discussion of switching costs related to an incumbent technology and a new one.
~ 32 ~ yields downward biased FE estimates of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Bond, 2002) similar to the estimated coefficient in regression (1) in Table 2Table (1)- (4) are based on the 2SLS estimator and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We instrumented the unbundling related variables ln(llu_price)*ms_llu and ln(llu_price)*ms_llu*East using the following list of excluded instruments: ln(llu_euprice)*ms_llu and ln(sa_euprice) in regressions (1), ln(llu_euprice)*ms_llu and pop_dens in regression (2), ln(llu_euprice)*ms_llu and Lag ln(llu_price) in regression (3), and ln(llu_euprice)*ms_llu, Lag ln(llu_price) and ln(sa_euprice) in regression (4). All regressions include country fixed effects but we exclude time effects which are jointly insignificant and we do not include a constant which is eliminated by the within transformation. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ~ 34 ~
Policy implications for NGN take-up
The NGN take-up rate is the ratio between NGN adoption and NGN coverage and ranges continuously in the [0;1] interval, as adoption cannot be higher than the installed capacity. In the case of optimal network utilization, the variable takes on the value of one. This ratio is important for three reasons: first, it is a relevant indicator of the willingness of consumers to migrate to a new technology; second, it is a measure of capacity utilization; third, it is a key policy variable implicitly defined by the DAE targets of the EC (as well as in other jurisdictions outside the EU).
In conjunction with the results from the related empirical literature, our results also indicate that the access price to old technology might have a negative effect on the take-up rate of the new technology. In particular, Briglauer (2015) finds that an increase in the unbundling price by one unit (1€, i.e. a roughly 10% increase at the mean value of the unbundling price)
increases NGN investment in the range of between 2.9% and 6.4% based on a comparable FEC regression. This clearly exceeds the respective point estimates of our NGN adoption models (0.7% to 1%). Putting these results together, the substantially stronger effect on NGN coverage suggests a negative impact of the unbundling price on the take-up rate. In turn, decreasing the unbundling price would positively affect the take-up rate but at the expense of lowering both adoption and coverage.
From a policy perspective, this implies that using a single instrument (i.e. the unbundling price) to influence both fiber-based broadband adoption and coverage goals is not sufficient because the impact of an unbundling price increase differs substantially on coverage and demand in terms of magnitude; hence, in order to increase adoption and coverage as well as take-up, it appears that additional policies, such as vouchers or tax deductions -next to increasing the unbundling price -are needed to promote demand expansion and take-up.
~ 35 ~ 7 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide evidence on a hotly debated issue, i.e. how to incentivize the migration to next generation broadband technology. In particular, the focus of the paper has been on the potential role of the unbundling access price which is imposed directly by NRAs on the old broadband networks and acts as a key policy variable to speed up investment and the adoption of new fiber-based broadband lines.
Our analysis has several policy relevant implications. Firstly, our results show that fiber adoption is characterized by the presence of path dependency. This implies that policies aimed at fostering retail migration are important to sustain demand expansion. At the same time, the existing regulation could affect fiber adoption via the retail level migration effect.
The data show that, in countries where the unbundling regime is well-established, relaxing the unbundling regulation, i.e. allowing an increase in access prices for the old legacy networks, could help to support a demand expansion by reducing the price differentials between the prices of standard broadband services and fiber-based ones. However, we found that there is considerable heterogeneity among EU Member States, implying, in particular, that the impact of unbundling policies are strongly weakened in Eastern European countries, where the regulated old broadband networks are much less developed. Clearly, the possible changes in the unbundling prices are only relevant in certain EU countries (mostly old EU16), but not across the entire continent. This casts doubts on the EC´s harmonizing approach which involves imposing similar regulations on all EU Member States.
Furthermore, the effect of an increase in the unbundling price is greater for fiber coverage than for adoption, thus widening the gap between adoption and coverage and therefore reducing the take-up rate. In other words, although it has a positive impact on fiber adoption, an increase in unbundling prices could also generate extra-capacity without sufficiently enhancing demand for new fiber-based services, thus implying that, on the demand side, ~ 36 ~ additional policies are needed to sustain demand expansion. This result is reminiscent of Tinbergen's maxim according to which the number of policy instruments must be equal to the number of policy targets.
From a technological point of view, it is also important to observe that the development of fiber infrastructures is not expected to limit the expansion of alternative technologies, such as mobile broadband networks. Current and future mobile technologies (4G/LTE and 5G) are considered a substitute for the provision of fiber broadband in the mid-term, especially in rural areas with high deployment costs and in areas where demand is still uncertain or low.
However, considering the comparatively lower average capacity and quality levels of current mobile broadband services, the two technologies (fixed and mobile) are expected to be complementary in other areas for the time being. In fact, both fixed and mobile broadband technologies have experienced massive growth in recent years (European Commission, 2017) .
Finally, it is important to stress that, in order to achieve the mid-term adoption of the EU Digital Agenda goal, consumers need to be persuaded of the potential benefits of new applications that make use of these higher speeds and need to be offered affordable prices in order to adopt them, e.g. via vouchers, tax deductions or other public demand stimuli. Only on the assumption that in the mid-term development of content and applications will automatically evolve after the necessary network technology has already been put in place and the welfare loss due to slower migration is not too large, the negative impact of the access price on the take-up rate can be considered as a second-order effect. In this context, future research should provide further theoretical and empirical assessments related to the welfare effects of the development of and migration to new (fixed and mobile) broadband networks and services, respectively. Total number of adopted FTTx technologies . This number is normalized to each country's total number of households (NGN_adop), population (NGN_adop_pw) or unweighted (NGN_adop_uw). Adoptions refer to premises under a commercial contract. "Premises" is a home or place of business.
FTTH Council Europe a)
Main independent variables and instruments Average total cost of the full LLU llu_price Monthly average total price for the full local loop unbundling (LLU) access in €.
EU DAE
Scoreboard b)
LLU interaction llu_price*ms_llu
Unbundling price (llu_price) multiplied by the share of unbundled local loop lines (ms_llu) to total retail broadband lines.
EU DAE Scoreboard
Average cost of shared access, sa_price
Monthly average total cost of shared access (sa_price) in €.
Average EU LLU price llu_euprice (instrument)
Average yearly unbundling price in non-focal EU member states calculated as: (EU aggregate unbundling price -unbundling price in member state i) / (n -1)).
Average EU sa_price sa_euprice (instrument)
Average yearly shared access price in non-focal EU member states calculated as: (EU aggregate shared access price -shared access price in member state i) / (n -1)).
Population density pop_dens (instrument)
Population density of a country in persons per square kilometer.
MarketLine c)
Competition control variables Entrant's market share broadband_comp New entrant's retail market share in fixed broadband lines based on wholesale access regulation sand own networks (incl. cable TV operators).
EU DAE Scoreboard
Mobile-to-fixed ratio mobile_comp
Ratio of Mobile Lines to Fixed Lines (Absolute).
MarketLine
Fixed legacy legacy
Total number of active fixed telecommunications landlines per 100 inhabitants. An active line connects the consumer's terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network lines (analogue and ISDN channels). 
Demand control variables broadband lines bb_lines
Number of total retail broadband lines based on DSL and coax cable that enable a higher than 144 Kbit/s download speed but exclude FTTx technologies.
EU DAE Scoreboard
Broadband adoption adop_bb_lines
Number of total retail broadband lines (bb_lines) adopted by consumers divided by total population.
EU DAE Scoreboard
Networked Readiness Index nri Propensity of a country to exploit the opportunities offered by information and communication technology (ICT).
Euromonitor e) Education education
Percentage of population having attained secondary or higher education, for the population aged 25 to 64 years.
Eurostat f)
Macroeconomic control variables
Long-term interest rate, interest rate Long-term interest rate for debt security issued after 10 years of maturity at the local currency unit rate. 
Cost control variables Hourly wage wage
Manufacturing wage per hour in € and same-year prices with fixed 2012 exchange rates.
Euromonitor Labour cost construct labcost_con
Annual labour cost index for the Construction branch by NACE Rev. 2 normalized to 100 in 2008. The index measures the development of the total cost, on an hourly basis, for employing the labor force, including wages and salaries, social security contributions, taxes, excluding subsidies.
Eurostat
Urban population urban_pop
Population of a country that lives in an urban environment as a share of the total population. 
